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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Ersell Harris, Jr., appeals from the find-
ing of guilty of the crime of forgery and the sentence im-
posed upon him in the Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Merrill Faux, pre-
siding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On September 28 and 29, 1970, the appellant, Ersell 
Harris, Jr., following a denial by the court of a Motion 
to Dismiss, was tried by a jury and was found guilty of 
the offense charged. On October 13, 1970, the court sen-
tenced Mr. Harris to serve the indeterminate term. as 
provided by law for the crime of forgery. 
2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of his convicti'o f . nm~ 
crune of forgery and an order releasing him f rom the 
custody of the Warden of the Utah State Prison. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 17, 1969, the defendant in the ra.11: 
at bar stood trial in Criminal Case No. 20544 in ThirdD~ 
trict Court, the Honorable D. Frank Wilkins, presiding 
The defendant was tried for a violation of ~76·26·1, Utah 
Code Annotated, (1953) (R. 3, 48). The jury was im 
paneled (R. 4), State's Exhibit 1 was introduced (R. rn, 
(see Exhibit 1). It was a bank draft on Hyrum Hiltor 
Plumbing and Heating, Inc. in the amount of $67.23 1~ 
Exhibit 1). Mr. Arthur R. Reynolds tetsified that he 
was working at the Buy-Rite Market, No. 6, located a1 
376 South 8th West on July 22, 1967 (R. 9). At that 
time Mr. Reynolds approved the check marked Statt' 
Exhibit 1 for cashing (R. 10) and watched a fellow em 
ployee cash it (R. 11). After the defense resred the: 
made a motion to dismiss which was granted by fut 
court (R. 75). 
On September 28, 1970, the defendant stood trial.r 
the case at bar criminal information No. 22177 in Tbirl 
District Court, 
1
the Honorable Merrill C. Faux, presidini 
The defendant was tried for a violation of ~77-26-1, Ubl 
Code Annotated, (1953) (T. 5). The jury was impand~ 
(T. 51) . The defense made a motion to the ~ 11 
dismiss on the grounds of double jeopardy (T. 15• ,,J 
.. 
The motion was denied (T. 51). The court clerk read 
lf1, ;11 fo1mation tu the jury (T. 51) and the court pro-
i'f<·ded t-0 trv the case. Exhibit No. 2 was introduced 
(T. 56, see Exhibit 2), it was a bank draft on Hyrum 
Hilton Plumbing and Heating, Inc. in the amount of 
~h'i.:23 ( s0e Exhibit). Mr. Arthur R. Reynolds testified 
th.it he \\ct~ \>vorking at the Buy-Rite Market, No. 6, lo-
cated at :m"i South 8th West (T. 58) on July 22, 1967 
rT. ;;9). At that time Mr. Reynolds approved the check 
marked State's Exhibit No. 1 (T. 60) and watched the 
check cashed (T. 60). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
DEFENDANT'S TRIAL PLACED HIM IN 
JEOPARDY TWICE AGAINST HIS RIGHTS 
AS G UAR A N TE E D BY THE FIFTH 
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION. HIS MOTION TO DIS-
MISS WAS TIMELY MADE AND SHOULD 
HA VE BEEN GRANTED BY THE TRIAL 
C 0 UR T. DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION 
MUST THEREFORE BE OVERTURNED. 
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784, 23 L. Ed. 2d 707, 
89 S. Ct. 2056 (1969), held the double jeopardy standard 
imposed by the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution applicable to state criminal prosecutions. 
In Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 437, 25 L. Ed. 2d 469 
4 
(1970), the S~preme Comt held Benton v. Marykuut 
supra, retroactive and held the criteria to be t1... . 
" . 1 1111t Ol 
smg e act, occurence or episode, or transaction." 
0 
The State's chief exhibit in Criminal Case No. 20544 
and the State's chief exhibit in Criminal Case No. 2211i 
are one in the same (see Exhibits) . It is undeniable 
that the first trial on criminal information No. 20544 
and the second trial on criminal information No. 2211': 
both involved the same single act, occurence, episode or 
transaction. In so far as the first trial was dismissed by 
the court after both the prosecution and defense had 
rested, jeopardy had attached under the decision in State ' 
v. Whitman, 93 Utah 557, 74 P. 2d 696 (1937). 
In Boykin v. Alabama, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 395 U.S.~~, 
23 L. Ed. 2d 27 4, the Supreme Court stated "the question 
of an effective waiver of a Federal Constitutional right 
in a proceeding is of course governed by federal stan· • 
<lards." 
As long ago as 1938, the Supreme Court held tbal 
courts must indulge every reasonable presumption agaillil 
waiver of fundamental rights. Johnson v. Zerbot, 58 ~. 
Ct. 1019, 304 U. S. 458, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938). In Bradl ' 
v. u. S., 397 u. s. 742, 90 s. Ct. 1463, 25 L. Ed. 2~ 7f I 
(1970), the Supreme Court went further in de~~· 
. di h t " · of constitu waiver reqwrements hol ng t a wru.vers 
tional rights not only must be voluntary, but must~ 
knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient auxzrenes> 
of the relevant circumstances and likely consequenas 
(Emphasis added.) 
In the ca,;e at bar there is no indication that defen-
dant was aware of his right against being twice placed 
in jeopardy nor is there any indication that he know-
ingly, intelligently or voluntarily waived this right with 
sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and 
likeh· consequences. 
In Boyhin, supra, the Supreme Court in discussing 
the federal constitutional right against compulsory self 
incrimination, right to trial by jury, and right to confront 
one's accusers went on to state "We cannot presume a 
waiver of these important federal rights from a silent 
record." 
To find waiver of the right to assert the defense of 
double jeopardy, the federal courts all held that the case 
must have at least proceeded to trial without presenta-
tion of the defense to the court. United States v. Ameri-
can Honda Motor Co., 273 F. Supp. 810 (1967); United 
States v. H. E. Komley Creamery, Inc., 232 F. Supp. 312 
(1964) ; United States v. Scotts, 464 F. Rpt. 2d 832; 
Barker v. Ohio, 328 F. Rpt. 2d 582; United States v. 
Bronomo, 441 F. Rpt. 2d 922 (1971). 
In so far as the record does not reflect a knowing, 
intelligent and voluntary waiver of defendant's federal 
constitutional right to not be placed twice in jeopardy 
and further does reveal an attempt by the defendant to 
present this defense in a form and at a time allowed 
within the federal standards his conviction should be re-
versed. 
POINT II. 
THE DEFENDANT WAS TRIED IN VIO-
LATION OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS AS GUARANTEED HIM UNDER 
ARTICLE 1, SECTION 12 OF THE UTAH 
STATE CONSTITUTION AND IN VIOLA. 
TION OF §77-24-13, UTAH CODE ANNO-
TATED, (1953) AND §77-1-10, UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED, (1953). HIS CONVICTION 
MUST BE OVERTURNED NOT WITH-
STANDING HIS FAIL URE TO ENTER A 
PLEA OF ONCE IN JEOPARDY AT HIS 
ARRAIGNMENT ON THE CHARGE IN 
THE CASE AT BAR. 
§77-24-13, Utah Code Annotated, (1953), srate; 
plainly that jeopardy "shall be a bar to another infonna· . 
tion." 
§77-1-10, Utah Code Annotated, (1953), sra!ei . 
plainly "nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy." 
Article 2, Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution sra~ . 
plainly "nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardr , 
for the some offense." 
The only questions presented is whether or not the 
defendant forever waived his defense of fonner jeopard' 
by his failure to plead such at his subsequent arraign· 
ment. In State v. Bohn, 67 Utah 362, 248 P. 119 ~1926i. 
the Supreme Court of Utah stated that "the nght to 
i 
µlead former conviction or acquittal, or once in jeopardy, 
is waived, unless made at the time of entering the plea 
or at such other time as the court may permit." It must 
be noted that the Bohn case, supra, was decided over 45 
\ears ago, the decision was based on precedent from al-
most 40 vears before that and both the Bohn case and 
the precedent upon which it relied involved substantially 
different factual situations than the case at bar. 
In the Bohn case, the defense was not presented to 
the court until time of appeal after the completion of 
trial and the rendering of a verdict. In the case at bar 
the defense, although not pleaded, was raised at the 
time set for trial and prior to reading of the information 
to the jury. 
Oklahoma has a statute similar to §77-24-1, Utah 
Code Annotated, (1953), requiring entry of a plea of 
fo1TI1er jeopardy at arraignment. In its present form this 
statute is 22 0. S. 1971 §515. In Mowels v. State, 52 Old. 
Ct. 193, 11 P. 2d 205 (1932), the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court held that failure to plead former jeopardy at time 
of arraignment waived the defense. Just this year the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court overruled this holding in 
Wallace v. State, Old. Cr., (unavailable), 505 P. 2d 1334 
(1973). The Court held that notwithstanding 22 0. S. 
1971 §515, the defendant did not waive his right 1;o the de-
fense of former jeopardy where there was a positive show-
ing on the record that he had unsuccessfuly presented the 
matter of former jeopardy to the trial court for consid-
eration. It is urged upon this court that they reexamine 
8 
the question the case at bar presents follow th od , em em 
trend and do as the Oklahoma Supreme Court d an over. 
rule the Bohn holding. 
POINT III. 
WHERE CASE LAW PERMITS WAIVER 
OF ENTRY OF PLEA AND THE COURT 
MINUTES DO NOT INDICATE FORMAL 
ENTRY OF PLEA, A MOTION TO DISMISS 
ON GROUNDS OF FORMER JEOPARDY 
MADE PRIOR TO READING OF THE IN-
FORMATION TO THE JURY IS TANTA-
MOUNT TO THE ENTRY OF A PLEA OF 
FORMER JEOPARDY. IF THE DEFENSE 
IS GOOD, THE MOTION MUST BE 
GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
In State v. Estes, 52 Utah 572, 176 P. 271 (1918), 
the Supreme Court of Utah held that a defendant may 
waive the right to enter a formal plea before going to 
trial. 
In the case at bar, the District Court transcript no-
where indicates that a formal arraignment was ever hcld 
or that the defendant ever entered a formal plea t.o the ' 
information. The only indication that a plea was ever ' 
entered is an unsigned and undated handwritten notation 
on the information (T. 5). The fact that the defendanfs 
plea was never stated to the jury (T. 51) by the clerk 
as is clearly mandatory under subsection (1) of ~77-31-1. 
Utah Code Annotated, (1953), as interpreted by our 
Supreme Court in State v. Telford, 89 Utah 22, 56 P. 2d 
1362 (1936), further buttresses the assertion that the 
defendant never availed himself of the opportunity to 
enter a formal plea. This being the case, defendant's 
motion to dismiss on the grounds of formal jeopardy, 
made to the court before the information was read to the 
juiy, would be his first formal answer to the charges and 
;is such constitutes a plea sufficient under §77-24-1, Utah 
Code Annotated, (1953). Hence defendant's motion de-
served the trial court's consideration on the merits. On 
its merits defendant's motion of former jeopardy is clearly 
good. (see Argument, Point I.) 
POINT IV. 
IN SO FAR AS DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL 
DID NOT TIMELY RAISE AN OBVIOUS 
AND EFFECTIVE DEFENSE TO HIS CON-
VICTION, THE DEFENDANT WAS DE-
NIED EFFECTIVE COUNSEL AND HIS 
CONVICTION MUST BE OVERTURNED. 
In Alires v. Turner, 449 P. 2d 241 (1969), the Utah 
Supreme Court held a defendant entitled "to the assist-
ance of a competent member of the Bar, who shows a 
willingness to identify himself with the interests of the 
defendant and present such defenses as are available to 
him under the law." 
Conley v. State, 248 N. E. 2d 803 (1972), held that 
"the defense attorney bears the affirmative obligation 
10 
of informing th~ defendant of his constitutional right, 
the existence of defenses, and the conseq:iences of his 
plea." 
In People v. Cortz, 91 Cal. Rptr. 6660 (1971), the 
court held that the defendant may attack ineffectivenes: , 
of counsel in connection with entry of plea as well a' in 
connection with trial on merits. In United States Ex , 
Rel. Watson v. Mazurkiewicz, 326 F. Supp. 622, (1971). 
the court stated: "It is part of a lawyer's obligation 10 
prepare his client to enter a knowing, intelligent plea." 
In the case at bar there is no indication that the de. 
fendant ever appeared with counsel and entered a plea. 
He did however have William J. Anderson as counsel up 
through July 14, 1970 (T. 12) and at the time of hi, 
trial was represented by John Russell. In any event 
where the defendant has an obvious defense that simply 
needs to be timely raised and the defense is not timeh · 
raised then he has had ineffective counsel under the 
Alires decision, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
In the case at bar the defendant was made to stand · 
trial in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Unired i 
States Constitution, Article I, Section 12 of the Utah 
State Constitution, and § 77-24-13 and § 77-1·10, Utah 1 
Code Annotated, (1953). The defendant raised his de-
fense of former jeopardy at the time set for his s~nd 
trial after the jury was impaneled but before the infor· 
-
11 
mation wai-; read to them. This is timely raising of the 
defense within federal standards and modern state st.and-
ards. Defendant's motion to dismiss should have been 
"ranted and the case dismissed. Therefore, his conviction 
" must be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JACK W. KUNKLER 
Attorney for Appell.ant 
